Papers, filings & meeting materials · updated August 2026

Archive

I.

Papers

6 entries
  1. 2020Working paperSSRN

    Algorithmically Developing Efficient Time-of-Use Electricity Rates

    An optimization method for designing time-of-use rates, replacing a regulator’s sense of reasonableness with rates that minimize the gap between TOU and hourly costs — and that let competing designs be compared directly.

    Time-of-use (“TOU”) electricity rates are challenging to design and results often rely on a regulator’s subjective sense of reasonableness. Here, I describe an objective method to develop TOU rates using optimization techniques. The method identifies rates which minimize the difference between TOU and hourly costs, thereby ensuring rates are efficient and cost based. The technique also enables direct comparison of competing designs. I conclude by demonstrating how this methodology could be applied in practice. Abstract Hide abstract

    Time-of-use (“TOU”) electricity rates are challenging to design and results often rely on a regulator’s subjective sense of reasonableness. Here, I describe an objective method to develop TOU rates using optimization techniques. The method identifies rates which minimize the difference between TOU and hourly costs, thereby ensuring rates are efficient and cost based. The technique also enables direct comparison of competing designs. I conclude by demonstrating how this methodology could be applied in practice.

  2. 2020Working paperSSRN

    Expensive, Ineffective, and Occasionally Counterproductive: Clean Peak Standards in New England

    A production-cost and capacity-expansion simulation of Clean Peak Standards on a New England-like system. Depending on formulation, CPS raise system costs while cutting emissions barely or not at all — a renewable portfolio standard buys five to ten times more abatement per dollar.

    Clean Peak Standards (“CPS”) have been proposed as a method to better align renewable generation with periods of higher electricity demand and higher emissions, by requiring that a percentage of peak period demand be met with renewables or clean-charged energy storage. Proponents argue that CPS can reduce costs, reduce emissions, and improve market efficiency. Using a production-cost and capacity-expansion optimization model, we assess how CPS may affect wholesale market outcomes. We parameterize the model to approximate the New England system, and we test combinations of CPS and Renewable Portfolio Standards that reflect needs into the 2040s. In some instances, we find that CPS are ineffective and expensive; in others, we observe that CPS make the grid dirtier and more expensive. CPS offer de minimis reductions in production costs (less than 1%), suggesting efficiency is not improved. Depending on formulation, CPS lead to modest increases in carbon emissions (less than 2%), or modest reductions. Reductions, when present, come at high cost: RPS can reduce emissions by 5–10 times more, per dollar spent. Despite the paucity of benefits, CPS increase system costs (less than 5%). These results suggest that regulators can achieve similar market and environmental outcomes, at lower cost, if they simply do not implement CPS. Abstract Hide abstract

    Clean Peak Standards (“CPS”) have been proposed as a method to better align renewable generation with periods of higher electricity demand and higher emissions, by requiring that a percentage of peak period demand be met with renewables or clean-charged energy storage. Proponents argue that CPS can reduce costs, reduce emissions, and improve market efficiency. Using a production-cost and capacity-expansion optimization model, we assess how CPS may affect wholesale market outcomes. We parameterize the model to approximate the New England system, and we test combinations of CPS and Renewable Portfolio Standards that reflect needs into the 2040s. In some instances, we find that CPS are ineffective and expensive; in others, we observe that CPS make the grid dirtier and more expensive. CPS offer de minimis reductions in production costs (less than 1%), suggesting efficiency is not improved. Depending on formulation, CPS lead to modest increases in carbon emissions (less than 2%), or modest reductions. Reductions, when present, come at high cost: RPS can reduce emissions by 5–10 times more, per dollar spent. Despite the paucity of benefits, CPS increase system costs (less than 5%). These results suggest that regulators can achieve similar market and environmental outcomes, at lower cost, if they simply do not implement CPS.

  3. 2019Journal articleEnergy Policy

    Reducing Emissions from Consumer Energy Storage Using Retail Rate Design

    Behind-the-meter batteries run to minimize bills tend to raise grid emissions. Pairing five years of ISO-NE and PJM data with fifteen commercial load profiles, the paper shows how much of that effect retail rate design can undo — in PJM the cleanest design induces half the emissions of the dirtiest.

    Energy Policy, vol. 129, pp. 481–490.

    Minimizing retail electricity costs via demand charge management and energy arbitrage is a common application of behind-the-meter energy storage systems (ESS). Research suggests that ESS tend to increase grid emissions, but some speculate that retail rate design could lessen its impact. This paper tests that theory. In this analysis, we pair five years of historic data from ISO New England and the PJM Interconnection with 15 commercial building load profiles to reveal how different rate designs influence emissions from ESS used for bill minimization. We find that rate design can be used to lessen the emissions impact of ESS in some markets and reduce net system emissions in others. Demand charges and energy charges offer multiple mechanisms to reduce ESS induced emissions: minimizing different types of demand charge requires different quantities of dispatch, and real-time energy charges increase dispatch relative to flat charges because the battery is used for both demand charge management and energy arbitrage. Separately, real-time energy charges reduce emissions per MWh stored because they exploit the positive correlation between marginal price and marginal emissions. A rate design that minimizes emissions in one market may increase them in another, which confounds universal solutions and highlights the need for approaches tailored to a specific market. Abstract Hide abstract

    Minimizing retail electricity costs via demand charge management and energy arbitrage is a common application of behind-the-meter energy storage systems (ESS). Research suggests that ESS tend to increase grid emissions, but some speculate that retail rate design could lessen its impact. This paper tests that theory. In this analysis, we pair five years of historic data from ISO New England and the PJM Interconnection with 15 commercial building load profiles to reveal how different rate designs influence emissions from ESS used for bill minimization. We find that rate design can be used to lessen the emissions impact of ESS in some markets and reduce net system emissions in others. Demand charges and energy charges offer multiple mechanisms to reduce ESS induced emissions: minimizing different types of demand charge requires different quantities of dispatch, and real-time energy charges increase dispatch relative to flat charges because the battery is used for both demand charge management and energy arbitrage. Separately, real-time energy charges reduce emissions per MWh stored because they exploit the positive correlation between marginal price and marginal emissions. A rate design that minimizes emissions in one market may increase them in another, which confounds universal solutions and highlights the need for approaches tailored to a specific market.

  4. 2017ThesisUT Austin

    Finding Carbon Breakeven: Induced Emissions from Economic Operation of Energy Storage

    Simulates a 1 MW / 4 MWh battery under three operating modes across sixteen systems ranging from 17% to 81% renewable energy, to find where storage stops adding carbon. Breakeven arrives between roughly 17% and 40% renewables, depending on how the battery is run.

    M.S. thesis; co-winner of the program’s best-thesis award.

  5. 2018White paperUT Energy Institute

    State-Level Financial Support for Electricity Generation Technologies

    Part of the Full Cost of Electricity study: an accounting of state subsidies, mandates and tax preferences across generation technologies, and what they add per unit of energy produced.

    With C.W. King, G. Gülen, J.S. Dyer, D. Spence and R. Baldick. UTEI/2018-1-1.

  6. 2017White paperUT Energy Institute

    Federal Financial Support for Electricity Generation Technologies

    The federal companion to the state-level study: tax credits, loan guarantees and direct spending traced by technology and normalized per MWh, so support can be compared across resources rather than headline dollars.

    With G. Gülen, J.S. Dyer, D. Spence and C.W. King. UTEI/2016-11-3.

II.

Wholesale Energy & Ancillary Services Markets

3 entries
  1. 2024AffidavitFERC EL24-91

    PJM: Opportunity-Cost Adders in Energy Market Price Formation

    Supporting affidavit in LS Power’s March 2024 complaint against PJM and its Independent Market Monitor over the treatment of opportunity-cost adders in energy market offers. FERC granted the complaint in part in August 2025, including key findings related to the need for transparency.

  2. 2023–2024PresentationsNEPOOL Markets Committee

    ISO-NE: Forward Reserve Market Offer Cap Changes

    An amendment to the offer cap in the Forward Reserve Market, brought during the transition to the day-ahead ancillary services design that ultimately replaced it. The original cap was $9,000/MW-month; the ISO proposed lowering it to $6,300, I proposed $7,200, and the ISO filed an in-between $7,100 — approved by FERC in ER24-1245.

    For LS Power Development.

  3. 2023CommentsFERC ER24-275

    ISO-NE: Challenges of the DASI Design for Fast & Flexible Resources

    Comments — just short of a protest — on ISO-NE’s proposal to establish a jointly optimized day-ahead market for energy and ancillary services, pressing the challenges the design creates for fast and flexible resources. FERC accepted the filing, effective March 1, 2025.

III.

Wholesale Capacity Markets

5 entries
  1. 2025PresentationsNEPOOL Markets Committee

    ISO-NE: Capacity Auction Reform — Prompt & Deactivation (CAR-PD)

    Amendments to the first phase of ISO-NE’s capacity market overhaul — the move from a three-year-forward annual auction to a prompt auction with a new resource deactivation process — pressed over four monthly meetings: expeditious deactivation for non-reliability resources, market-relevant COPT values for the prompt-auction transition, extended outages, the three-year rule, and state-jurisdictional interconnection agreements. Changes to resource forced-retirement rules were amended in a separate proceeding (ER26-1956).

    For LS Power Development.

  2. 2023PresentationsNEPOOL Markets Committee

    ISO-NE: Letting Repowered Resources Unwind Capacity Obligations

    A proposed mechanism for resources being repowered to exit existing capacity commitments, so rebuilding a plant does not require carrying an obligation the old configuration can no longer meet. Failed at the Participants Committee.

    For LS Power Development.

  3. 2022–2024Memo & presentationsNEPOOL Markets Committee

    ISO-NE: Unit-Specific Gas Availability & Atypical Outages in Resource Capacity Accreditation

    A year-long campaign of modeling work (largely) arguing that gas-only resources should be accredited on unit-specific fuel availability, and showing how that could be built into ISO-NE’s accreditation project — plus a separate set of amendments on the treatment of atypical equipment outages. ISO-NE halted RCA, and these issues withered on the vine.

    For LS Power Development.

  4. 2022ProtestFERC EL22-42

    ISO-NE: RENEW & ACP Complaint on Gas Accreditation

    Protest of a complaint arguing that ISO-NE unduly favors gas-only generators by accrediting them as if fuel were always available. FERC dismissed the complaint in February 2023, deferring to the region’s accreditation stakeholder process.

  5. 2020–2021Affidavit, memo & presentationsFERC ER21-1637

    ISO-NE: Storage Revenues in the CONE / Offer Review Trigger Price Reset

    Alternative estimates of the energy-and-ancillary-services offset in the offer review trigger price reset — how much market revenue a new storage project could realistically expect to earn, and therefore the offer floor it faces entering the capacity auction. Three presentations and a memo to the NEPOOL Markets Committee through fall 2020, then a supporting affidavit filed with the NEPOOL-approved proposal at FERC. FERC accepted the update for FCA 15 in June 2021.

    For the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office.

IV.

New England Energy Security

3 entries
  1. 2022–2023CommentsFERC AD22-9

    New England Winter Gas-Electric Forums

    Two rounds of comments in FERC’s forums on New England winter reliability, where cold-weather gas supply constraints repeatedly put the regional grid at risk — including one set of in-person testimony at a commissioner-led conference in Maine.

  2. 2019–2020Affidavit, answer & presentationsFERC ER20-1567

    ISO-NE: Energy Security Improvements

    From the AGO’s Chapter 3 preliminary proposal (with London Economics International) through ISO-NE’s proposed day-ahead ancillary products for winter energy security, and two amendments pressed over six months of committee meetings to better balance energy security, price formation and consumer cost: eliminate the Replacement Energy Reserve product, and add a look-back provision to the settlement of the new day-ahead reserve products. NEPOOL adopted variations of both; FERC ultimately rejected ESI itself (ER20-1567), and the design questions returned — and were resolved — in DASI.

    For the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office; amendments with C. Belew.

  3. 2019AffidavitFERC ER19-1428

    ISO-NE: Inventoried Energy Program

    Affidavit on ISO-NE’s interim winter program, the Inventoried Energy Program, which paid resources to hold energy inventory on cold days, and whether payments from the IEP would buy reliability the region was not already getting. FERC accepted the program, which ran for the 2023/24 and 2024/25 winters.

V.

Rate Design, Resource Planning & Miscellany

6 entries
Rate cases, avoided-cost studies, and the occasional step back from the dockets.
  1. 2021Expert testimonyMA DPU 20-120

    National Grid Gas Distribution Rate Case

    Direct and surrebuttal testimony on how the company calculated marginal distribution costs — the figures that drive rate design and the economics of gas system expansion.

  2. 2020Report & teach-inMassachusetts AGO

    Wholesale Electric Market Design for a Low/No-Carbon Future

    Report on an October 2019 symposium convening market designers, regulators and states on what wholesale markets should look like as the region decarbonizes — paired with an internal teach-in explaining ISO-NE, NEPOOL and the wholesale markets from first principles for lawyers and analysts new to the region.

    Report with M. Hoffer, R. Tepper and the Regulatory Assistance Project.

  3. 2020PresentationMA DPU 20-69

    Value of Electric-Vehicle Time-of-Use Rates for Massachusetts Customers

    Technical-session analysis of what EV time-of-use rates are actually worth to customers and the system, and how design choices divide those savings.

    For the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office.

  4. 2013 & 2018ReportsAESC Study Group

    Avoided Energy Supply Components in New England

    The triennial study that sets the avoided-cost values New England program administrators use to screen energy efficiency investments. Worked on the 2013 and 2018 editions of AESC.

    With Synapse Energy Economics and Resource Insight.

  5. 2018ReportN.S. UARB M08349

    Review of Nova Scotia Power’s Proposed AMI Opt-Out Charge

    Review of the utility’s compliance filing on what customers declining a smart meter would be charged, and whether the charge reflected real avoidable costs.

    With P. Chernick, for the Nova Scotia Consumer Advocate.

  6. 2012Expert reportEPA R09-OAR-2012-0021

    Affordability of Pollution Control on the Apache Coal Units

    Review of the cooperative’s claim that regional haze controls at its Apache coal units were unaffordable, in EPA’s rulemaking on the Arizona plan.

    With P. Chernick, for the Sierra Club.